A teleological explanation is an explanation in terms of an end or a purpose. So saying that ‘X came about for the sake of Y’ is a teleological account of X. It is a striking feature of ancient Greek philosophy that many thinkers accepted that the world should be explained in this way. However, before Aristotle, teleological explanations of the cosmos were generally based on the idea that it had been created by a divine intelligence. If an intelligent power made (...) the world, then it makes sense that it did so with a purpose in mind, so grasping this purpose will help us understand the world. This is the pattern of teleological explanation that we find in the Presocratics and in Plato. However, with Aristotle teleology underwent a change: instead of thinking that the ends were explanatory because a mind had sought to bring them about, Aristotle took the ends to operate in natural beings independently of the efforts of any creative intelligence. Indeed, he thought that his predecessors had failed to understand what was distinctive of nature, namely, that its ends work from the inside of natural beings themselves. (shrink)

In this chapter, we argue that trust can be better understood in relation to people’s attempts to deal with vulnerability in social interactions. Different situations afford different forms of adaptation that correspond to different forms of trust. We describe three forms of trust: trust as a decision, trust as a performance and trust as an uncontrollable force. We show how these different types of trust differ with respect to assumptions about trust, trustworthiness and agency as well as with respect to (...) the accompanying emotions and outline a tentative process model of trust. We conclude the chapter by reviewing the contribution of the suggested framework as well as indicating questions for further research. (shrink)

In his opening speech, Timaeus (Timaeus27d5-29b1) argues that the cosmos must be the product of a craftsman looking to an eternal paradigm. Yet his premises seem at best to justify only that the world could have been made by such a craftsman. This paper seeks to clarify Timaeus’ justification for his stronger conclusion. It is argued that Timaeus sees a necessary role for craftsmanship as a cause that makes becoming like being.

"Berkeley na história do ceticismo" é uma tradução para o português do artigo “Berkeley in the History of Scepticism”, publicado originalmente em inglês em: R. H. Popkin, E. de Olaso, e G. Tonelli (Orgs.) Scepticism in the Enlightenment, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 173-186.

This paper seeks to expand our understanding of initial trust by looking at how variation in risk influences the nature of trust and the process of initial trust formation. Four hypotheses were tested in two experiments involving participants with and without work experience. A first hypothesis suggested a positive relationship between a general propensity to trust and initial trust; a second hypothesis, a negative relationship between risk and initial trust; whereas a third hypothesis posited that risk would increase the importance (...) participants place on benevolence and integrity. A fourth hypothesis suggested that risk would have a positive and moderating influence on the effect of out-of-role behavior when presented after role-conformant in-role behavior. Findings are presented and discussed and practical implications suggested. (shrink)

Tradução de uma carta do filósofo George Berkeley, publicada originalmente no Philosophical Transactions, boletim oficial da Royal Society, de Londres, em outubro de 1717. No extrato da carta aqui traduzida sobre as erupções do Vesúvio Berkeley revela­-se um observador curioso e preciso. É notável, acima de tudo, a qualidade literária do seu texto, uma característica que seus trabalhos anteriores, especialmente os Três diálogos entre Hylas e Philonous, de 1713, já haviam revelado. Essa talvez seja uma das principais razões que fazem (...) da carta um documento histórico-científico de permanente interesse. (shrink)

A tradução aqui apresentada consiste no Prefácio à tradução francesa de Siris, obra de George Berkeley publicada em inglês em 1744 e traduzida para o francês em 1745 por David-Renaud Boullier. Neste prefácio a Siris, publicada em francês com o título Recherches sur les vertus de l’eau de goudron, où l’on a joint des réflexions philosophiques sur divers autres sujets, além de oferecer um bom resumo da obra, Boullier explica a filosofia imaterialista de Berkeley e a apresenta favoravelmente como um (...) antídoto interessante para as concepções materialistas. (shrink)

Tradução para o português da "Dissertation on passions", de David Hume. Tradução realizada com base nas seguintes edições: 1. Four Dissertations/ David Hume, edited by John Immerwahr. (Facsimile da edição de 1757 publicada por A. Millar, Thoemmes Press, 1995); 2. A Dissertation on the passions ; The natural history of religion : a critical edition /David Hume; edited by Tom L. Be auchamp. (The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. Oxford: Ox ford University Press, 2007); 3. The Complete (...) Works of David Hume . 1882-1886, edited by Green T.H. & Grose, T. H. (Edição eletrônica in CD-ROM, Série “Past Masters”. Charlottesville : InteLex Corporation, 1992). A paginação entre // corresponde à paginação da edição de 1757, reproduzida na edição da Thoemmes Prees, 1995, editad a por John Immerwahr. (shrink)

Este discurso, encontrado entre os manuscritos de Berkeley, foi publicado pela primeira vez em 1871 por Alexander Campbell Fraser, em sua Collected Edition of the Works of Bishop Berkeley with Annotations.(LL pp. 598-604). No final do manuscrito, que atualmente se encontra no Museu Britânico, Berkeley registrou a data de 11 de janeiro de 1707/8. Berkeley tinha então 23 anos de idade. Isso indica que este discurso, próximo dos sermões que depois ele viria a escrever, foi escrito antes de ser ordenado (...) diácono da Igreja da Irlanda na capela do colégio do Trinity College de Dublin em 19 de fevereiro de 1709. A tradução aqui apresentada baseia-se na edição organizada por Luce e Jessop. The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. Luce, A. A. and Jessop, T. E. London and Edimburgh: Nelson, 1948, v. 7, 9-15. (shrink)

Across two studies the hypotheses were tested that stressful situations affect both leadership ethical acting and leaders' recognition of ethical dilemmas. In the studies, decision makers recruited from 3 sites of a Swedish multinational civil engineering company provided personal data on stressful situations, made ethical decisions, and answered to stress-outcome questions. Stressful situations were observed to have a greater impact on ethical acting than on the recognition of ethical dilemmas. This was particularly true for situations involving punishment and lack of (...) rewards. The results are important for the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of an organization, especially with regard to the analysis of the Stressors influencing managerial work and its implications for ethical behavior. (shrink)

Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...) trust on the formulation stage. It should also benefit from exploring the structuring effects of trust in organizations. Throughout this chapter, ways to extend current research on trust in organizations are suggested. The chapter also provides examples of relevant contributions where available. In order to capture organizational effects of trust, it is suggested that trust should be studied over longer time intervals, and include several referents of trust, spanning both horizontal and vertical relationships in the organization. (shrink)

Nota introdutória sobre a tradução da "Dissertação sobre as paixões", de David Hume.

George Berkeley. Alciphron/Siris. Tradução, apresentação e notas de Jaimir Conte. São Paulo: Editora da Unesp, 2022. O volume reúne traduções de duas obras de George Berkeley, “Alciphron, ou o filósofo minucioso” e “Siris”. “Alciphron” é estruturado como um diálogo filosófico entre quatro personagens, no qual Berkeley combate os argumentos dos chamados “livres-pensadores” (como Mandeville ou Shaftesbury), fazendo uma apologia do Cristianismo. Já “Siris” é tanto um tratado sobre as virtudes medicinais da água de alcatrão quanto uma visão do filósofo (...) das cadeias do ser, explorando a gradual ascensão que vai do mundo dos sentidos e da mente, até chegar ao sobrenatural e a Deus, a essência trina. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do artigo de Richard H. Popkin "Did Hume Ever Read Berkeley?", publicado em "The Journal of Philosophy". Volume LVI, número 12, 1959, pp. 535-545.

Tradução para o português do artigo de Richard H. Popkin, "So, Hume Ever Read Berkeley?", publicado originalmente em "The Journal of Philosophy". Volume LXI, número 24, 1964, pp. 773-778.

I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. (...) We are left with three options: denying that there are any reasons for attitudes, opting for pragmatism about reasons for attitudes, or arguing that the challenge rests on a misunderstanding of the normative force of reasons for attitudes. I finally suggest a version of the last strategy. We can understand the normative force of reasons for attitudes, and thereby solve the problem of mental responsibility, by acknowledging that the way we blame each other for failing to respond correctly to our reasons for attitudes is different from the way we blame each other when one failed to respond correctly to reasons for action. (shrink)

Este texto sistematiza e reorganiza uma comunicação apresentada em 06 de novembro de 2020 no evento online comemorativo dos 20 anos do Grupo Hume da UFMG, idealizado pela professora Lívia Guimarães, grande incentivadora dos estudos sobre a filosofia de David Hume no Brasil.

In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffability’ is ambiguous, too, (...) and we should make a distinction between weak and strong ineffability. Weak ineffability is rooted in the deficiencies of a particular language while strong ineffability stems from the structure of a particular cognitive system and its capacities for conceptual mental representation. Mental contents are only sayable if we are able to conceptualize them and then create signs to represent them in communication. (shrink)

Sebastian Schmidt (Zürich) fragt in seinem Beitrag »Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker?«, wie es um die Vernunft derjenigen steht, die einer Verschwörungstheorie über die Corona-Pandemie anhängen. Im Umgang mit Corona scheint sich zu bestätigen, was die Psychologie seit Jahrzehnten lehrt: Menschen unterliegen in ihrem Denken kognitiven Fehlern und Verzerrungen. Doch ist verschwörungstheoretisches Denken, das solche Fehler ebenfalls begeht, deshalb irrational? Schmidt warnt davor, einander zu leichtfertig als irrational zu betrachten, und verweist auf die wichtige Rolle, die intellektuelles Vertrauen in Wissensgemeinschaften (...) spielt. Am Beispiel des sogenannten Bestätigungsfehlers führt er aus, dass Menschen, die ihre Überzeugungen nicht fortwährend kritisch prüfen, in diesem Verhalten durchaus rational sein können. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

This chapter locates our overall approach within the dialectic of contemporary philosophical debates and provides an overall framework for discussion. First, I introduce the problem of mental normativity. I show how this problem poses a prima facie threat to the common assumption in epistemology and metaethics that beliefs and other attitudes are governed by robust normative requirements. Secondly, I motivate philosophical inquiry about an ethics of mind by tracing this field back to recent debates in the ethics of belief. I (...) characterize the ethics of mind as being concerned with two main questions: 1. How can we be responsible for our attitudes? 2. What attitudes should we have? Finally, I give an overview over the structure of the book and summarize the chapters. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspired by Quine’s 1969 paper on Natural Kinds, Peter Gärdenfors proposes a cognitive criterion based on his theory of Conceptual Spaces (CS). He argues the good predicates are those referring to natural concepts, and that we can capture naturalness in terms (...) of similarity. In contrast to Quine, he does not primarily rely on logic, but geometry. He frames his account as a descriptive project, however, and it is not obvious how it addresses the normative dimension of Goodman’s Riddle. This paper develops a charitable reconstruction of his argument, based on the idea that the instrumental success of our projectible concepts is grounded in their cognitive-pragmatic naturalness. It then explores three lines of reasoning against the argument: Evolutionarily motivated skepticism, the miracles argument, and the relation between instrumental and pragmatic success. I conclude that in its current form, the CS account fails to provide any justification of reasoning beyond appealing to its instrumental success, and that a metaphysically robust notion of naturalness helps to achieve the desired goal. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and (...) that (1) is unlikely to be true. This obviates the need to explain the alleged rational incoherence, and so Baker’s objection to Schroeder’s expressivism is undermined. (shrink)

Broome takes the debate on rationality to be concerned with the ordinary use of 'rational'. I argue that this is at best misleading. For the object of current theories of rationality is determined by a specific use of 'rational' that is intimately connected to blame and praise. I call the property it refers to 'rationalityRESP'. This focus on rationalityRESP, I argue, has two significant implications for Broome's critique of theories of rationality as reasons-responsiveness. First, rationalityRESP is plausibly conceived of as (...) a kind of reasons-responsiveness. Secondly, Broome's dispute with internalists about normativity as well as his dispute with externalists about rationality both hinge on questions regarding the concept of responsibility. I conclude that philosophers should integrate discussions about responsibility in their debates about rationality. (shrink)

Os Ensaios Políticos de Hume tiveram uma enorme audiência e considerável influência sobre seus contemporâneos. Mas as reflexões de Hume sobre a política nem sempre tiveram a atenção que merecem, situação que ultimamente vem se revertendo graças a uma série de estudos que iluminam a sua importância. É por isso mais que oportuna a publicação desta edição dos Ensaios, enriquecida com o estudo de João Paulo Monteiro, que, de forma pioneira em língua portuguesa, soube situar o interesse de Hume pela (...) política no quadro mais amplo de suas preocupações filosóficas, bem como mostrar a relevância de sua ciência política, entendida como uma ciência do possível, fundada na experiência histórica, dedicada ao estudo das leis constitucionais e de seus efeitos sobre a sociedade, de forma comprometida com as questões e impasses políticos de seu tempo. Maria Isabel Limongi. (shrink)

Os Ensaios Políticos de Hume tiveram uma enorme audiência e considerável influência sobre seus contemporâneos. Mas as reflexões de Hume sobre a política nem sempre tiveram a atenção que merecem, situação que ultimamente vem se revertendo graças a uma série de estudos que iluminam a sua importância. É por isso mais que oportuna a publicação desta edição dos Ensaios, enriquecida com o estudo de João Paulo Monteiro, que, de forma pioneira em língua portuguesa, soube situar o interesse de Hume pela (...) política no quadro mais amplo de suas preocupações filosóficas, bem como mostrar a relevância de sua ciência política, entendida como uma ciência do possível, fundada na experiência histórica, dedicada ao estudo das leis constitucionais e de seus efeitos sobre a sociedade, de forma comprometida com as questões e impasses políticos de seu tempo. Maria Isabel Limongi. (shrink)

Este livro propõe uma nova maneira de olhar para a filosofia do bispo e filósofo irlandês George Berkeley (1685-1753), mais conhecido pela negação da existência da matéria e pela defesa do idealismo e de teses empiristas. O autor, Costica Bradatan, aborda o pensamento de Berkeley do ponto de vista de suas raízes e influências em vez de como ele passou a ser interpretado posteriormente. Como o título sugere, o livro constitui um retrato alternativo de Berkeley, diferente da imagem predominante formada (...) a partir de uma leitura de tendência analítica, que privilegia as suas obras da juventude, especialmente o Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano (1710) e os Três diálogos entre Hylas e Philonous (1713). Este outro retrato de Berkeley procura mostrar um filósofo que leu e escreveu livros sobre alquimia, que elaborou projetos utópicos e buscou as “ilhas felizes” e o “paraíso terrestre”. Bradatan procura mostrar que a nova atitude de Berkeley em relação ao mundo material ecoou a teologia dualista dos cátaros; que seu pensamento estava enraizado nas tradições platônicas, místicas e esotéricas; que ele via a filosofia como uma espécie de salvação e a ser praticada como um modo de vida. Bradatan retrata um Berkeley muito mais rico e realista, um pensador mais profundo e espetacular. Além de ser um estudo sobre o pensamento de Berkeley em particular, com análises das suas últimas grandes obras, Alciphron, ou o filósofo minucioso (1732) e Siris (1744), o livro é um excelente exemplo da compreensão do pensamento de um filósofo à luz da história da filosofia. Este livro é de interesse para estudiosos que trabalham em uma ampla variedade de campos do saber, desde filosofia e história das ideias até literatura comparada, estudos utópicos, estudos religiosos e medievais e teoria crítica. (shrink)

Prefácio ao livro Peter F. Strawson: Metafísica e Ceticismo, de Itamar Luís Gelain.

Esta coletânea é um tributo a Peter Frederick Strawson pelo centenário de seu nascimento (1919-2019). Diferentemente de outras coletâneas, esta propõe colocar em relevo a interlocução de Strawson com a tradição filosófica. Em outras palavras, por um lado, queremos evidenciar as discussões que Strawson travou com os seus contemporâneos (Austin, Quine, Russell e Wittgenstein), e, por outro, a influência que recebeu e as críticas que dirigiu àqueles que o precederam na história da filosofia (Aristóteles, Descartes, Hume, Kant). Poderíamos ter enriquecido (...) a lista acima com o nome de muitos outros filósofos com os quais Strawson teve contato, mas julgamos que o trabalho ficaria bastante extenso. Por esse motivo, optamos por aqueles nomes mais significativos que figuram na construção da história intelectual de Strawson. O presente volume reúne nove capítulos que levam como título o nome de Strawson e do filósofo com o qual ele dialogou ao longo de suas obras. Essa opção na nomeação dos capítulos por si só já permite colocar em evidência os principais filósofos pelos quais Strawson se interessou e com os quais se confrontou ao longo de seu trabalho filosófico. Com exceção do capítulo sobre Wittgenstein, que é uma versão revisada de um texto publicado anteriormente, todos os outros capítulos são inéditos e foram escritos especialmente para esta coletânea. O volume inclui na abertura a tradução de “Um fragmento de autobiografia intelectual”, de P. F. Strawson. Quando elegemos como título desta obra, Strawson e a tradição filosófica, não estamos insinuando que Strawson é um historiador da filosofia e muito menos que se interesse por historiografia. O título desta obra apenas quer indicar que Strawson, por um lado, transita na história da filosofia com alguma facilidade, além de nutrir um grande apreço por ela e, por outro, que ele discute com os principais nomes da história da filosofia no que concerne aos temas de seu interesse. A sua proposta filosófica é alimentada e irrigada por esse conhecimento, o que lhe dá a possibilidade de assumir na maioria das vezes posições ponderadas e equilibradas acerca de temas complexos por ele tratados. ​ ISBN: 978-85-5696-689-6. Nº de pág.: 244. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

a simple derivation of the effect induced from repeated measurements on quantum unstable systems is obtained by using the regularized incomplete beta - function .

ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...) their phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here. (shrink)

What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti‐normativism). I argue against (...) both accounts and defend the traditional view. An agent can be blameworthy in doxastic dilemmas for complying with their practical but not their epistemic reasons. This reveals how epistemic reasons are normative: the concept of epistemic blame helps us track epistemic normativity. (shrink)

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...) of study of which normative pressures, if any, govern attention. Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, i.e. to what is subject to such normative pressures. Philosophers should develop an ethics of attention that helps to provide normative guidance and that is commensurate in its richness to the descriptive significance of attention. The second half of the paper sketches a framework that may help us to get started at developing the ethics of attention. (shrink)

It has been argued that the explanation of self-control requires positing special motivational powers. Some think that we need will-power as an irreducible mental faculty; others that we need to think of the active self as a dedicated and depletable pool of psychic energy or – in today more respectable terminology – mental resources; finally, there is the idea that self-control requires postulating a deep division between reason and passion – a deliberative and an emotional motivational system. This essay argues (...) that no such special motivational powers are necessary. Yet, at the same time, self-control does powerfully illustrate the importance of a feature of the mind. What it illustrates, I argue, is the importance of the mental activity of attention in the control of all action. It is by appeal to this mental activity that we can dispense with special motivational powers. If we think of Humeanism as the view that there is fundamentally only one kind of motivational system and that all action is based in that system, then this essay contributes to a defense of Humeanism. On the other hand, the essay also shows that any model of agency in terms of only beliefs and desires, motivational and representational states, or preferences and credences is incomplete. A different conception of Humeanism as the view that every mental state is either motivational, representational, or a combination of them, is false. (shrink)

Crisis prevention plans are usually evaluated based on their effects in terms of preventing or limiting organizational crisis. In this survey-based study, the focus was instead on how such plans influence employees’ reactions in terms of risk perception and well-being. Five different organizations were addressed in the study. Hypothesis 1 tested the assumption that leadership crisis preparation would lead to lower perceived risk among the employees. Hypothesis 2 tested the conjecture that it would also lead to a higher degree of (...) well-being. Both hypotheses were supported. The results and their implications are discussed. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Meta-ethical expressivism was traditionally seen as the view that normative judgements are not beliefs. Recently, quasi-realists have argued, via a minimalist conception of “belief”, that expressivism is fully compatible with normative judgements being beliefs. This maneuver is successful, however, only if quasi-realists have really offered an expressivist-friendly account of belief that captures all platitudes characterizing belief. But, quasi-realists’ account has a crucial gap, namely how to account for the propositional contents of normative beliefs in an expressivist-friendly manner. In particular, quasi-realists (...) haven’t yet developed their preferred option, a “minimalist” or “deflationist” account of such contents. This paper aims to close that gap. I argue that expressivists who accepts conceptual role semantics and use an account of that-clauses in their use in belief-attributions based on Wilfrid Sellars’ work can give a deflationary account of the contents of beliefs that is compatible with normative judgements being beliefs, even if expressivism is true. (shrink)

Tradução para o português de "L'Entretien de Pascal avec M. de Saci" - Colóquio com o Senhor de Saci Sobre Epicteto e Montaigne". Tradução realizada com base na edição das Œuvres completes de Pascal, estabelecida e anotada por Jacques Chevalier, da Bibliothèque de la Plêiade, Paris, 1954, p. 560-574.

I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?

Meu objetivo neste artigo é destacar algumas das ideias centrais defendidas por Hume e, a fim de caracterizar a natureza de sua filosofia, contrapor duas interpretações frequentes de sua obra: a interpretação cética e interpretação naturalista. A fim de apontar as principais razões que estão por trás dessas duas interpretações que tentam apreender a natureza da filosofia de Hume, procuro abordar inicialmente alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria humeana e, em seguida, especialmente sua análise das inferências causais. No final, argumento (...) que o ceticismo e o naturalismo de Hume não são incompatíveis. Ao contrário, devem ser entendidos como duas faces de uma mesma filosofia. (shrink)

It has been argued that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. Recent defenses of the normativity of rationality assume that this implies that we always ought to be rational. However, this follows only if the reasons rationality requires us to correctly respond to are normative reasons. Recent meta-epistemological contributions have questioned whether epistemic reasons are normative. If they were right, then epistemic rationality wouldn’t provide us with normative reasons independently of wrong-kind reasons to be epistemically rational. This paper spells (...) out this neglected challenge for the normativity of epistemic rationality by connecting the two bodies of literature. Moreover, it generalizes this challenge to the rationality of desire, intention, and emotion. The upshot is that we can only answer the normative question about rationality if we debate about blame and accountability for holding different kinds of irrational attitudes, as well as about the sources of mental normativity. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...) epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical – either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable – or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and develop a different account based on some passages (...) from Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystica Theologia. ‘God is ineffable’ is a metalinguistic statement concerning propositions about God: not all propositions about God are expressible in a human language. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

I argue that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense possible and in some sense impossible. It is impossible insofar as we think of belief formation as a re-sult of our exercise of certain capacities (perception, memory, agency). But insofar as we think of belief formation as an action that might lead to such a result (i.e. a deliberation or an in-quiry), believing at will is possible. First I present and clarify the problem (...) and its philosophical relevance (section 1). I then argue that a belief formation as an immediate reaction to practical reasons is not necessarily equivalent to believing at will because the causal mechanism that leads to the formation might be deviant (section 2). Finally, I explain the difference between the two above mentioned meanings of “belief formation” in order to clarify the possibility and impossibility of believing at will (section 3). (shrink)